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Economic integration and government revenue
from ﬁnancial repression
Yothin Jinjarak *
Department of Financial and Management Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London, WC1H0XG, United Kingdom
1. Introduction
The ﬁnancial repression revenue is the ‘easy-to-tax’ revenue source of developing country
governments, commonly used along with import/export tariffs and seigniorage. A channel of this
implicit taxation relies on the imposition of governmental controls on international capital ﬂows and
domestic ﬁnancial intermediaries, thereby increasing a wedge between the effective foreign rate and
domestic rate of interest payments on public debt. Essentially, the resultant wedge between the
foreign and domestic interest rates is a tax on ﬁnancial transactions, providing in turn a subsidy or
saving on interest liabilities to the government.
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How prevalent is the government revenue from ﬁnancial repression? In the 1970s, this revenue
was as high as 39% of total revenue in Mexico and 22% in India; see Giovannini and De Melo (1993).
Since the 1980s, the global economy has embraced policy reforms towards more trade and ﬁnancial
integration, liberalisation and stabilisation. These reforms have inﬂuenced a common ﬁscal
denominator, in the process reducing the gap between the foreign and domestic interest rate, and
hence the government revenue from ﬁnancial repression. In Table 1 we offer an update of the ﬁnancial
repression revenue for the 1990s and 2000s. Notably, in the sample of 62 countries, the average of
ﬁnancial repression revenue to GDP is 4%, ranging, for instance, from 2.6% in Mexico to 6.2% in
Argentina.
The mechanism in which economic integration affects revenue from ﬁnancial repression is
operating through the reduction of an existing gap between foreign and domestic interest rates. The
theoretical argument for the association between economic integration and ﬁnancial repression
revenue suggests that ﬁnancial openness is the main and direct channel. The ﬁnancial openness
enhances the mobility of resources and allows risk sharing between savers and investors across
borders. This in turn should impose discipline on the ﬁscal and ﬁnancial policies so that the ability of
the public sector to borrow at artiﬁcially low interest rates domestically is constrained by the
international capital markets that are now ﬁnancially opened to the local savers and investors
(Kletzer, 2004). Alternatively, trade channel may also be instrumental in reducing the ﬁnancial
repression revenue. Aizenman (2004, 2008) outlines a theoretical model accounting for a model
accounting for the endogenous linkages between trade openness (i.e. declining tariffs and non-tariff
barriers) and ﬁnancial openness (i.e. lowering capital controls and increasing capital ﬂows). In the
model, greater trade openness increases the effective cost of ﬁscally enforcing import over-invoicing/
export under-invoicing, the illicit capital movement that facilitates ﬁnancial repression, which in turn
reducing the usefulness of ﬁnancial repression as an implicit tax and enhancing policy reform towards
the ﬁnancial openness.1 The association between ﬁnancial repression, trade and ﬁnancial openness is
therefore an empirical question that provides the hypothesis of our study.
This study adds to strand of literature that focuses on the intertwining of public ﬁnance and
international factor movements. Earlier studies on the government revenue from ﬁnancial repression
in an international context include Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011), Kletzer (2004), Serven and Perry
(2005), Demetriades and Luintel (1997), Dooley (1996), Giovannini and De Melo (1993), Cukierman
et al. (1992), and Diaz Alejandro (1985). By and large, these studies document the extent of ﬁnancial
repression in the periods following the ﬁnancial turbulences in the 1970s and prior to the 2000s in a
small set of countries, some of which are country speciﬁc. For instance, Serven and Perry ﬁnd in the
case of Argentina that from the beginning of its major trade and ﬁnancial opening in 1991 to
macroeconomic collapse in 2002, the cost of reﬁnancing public debt had been on the rise, with the
implicit interest rate increased from 5% in 1993 to 8% in 2001, together with the steady growth of
public debt stock further deteriorating repayment capacity of the Argentine government. Reinhart and
Sbrancia ﬁnd in that the ﬁnancial repression is effective when accompanied by a steady rise of
inﬂation during 1945–1980 for the advanced economies. Our study contributes to the literature by
expanding both the countries and years coverage, measuring directly the ﬁnancial repression revenue
from several data sources, as well as formally testing the relationship between trade and ﬁnancial
openness, and the ﬁnancial repression revenue in various speciﬁcations.
2. Estimation
The hypothesis of our testing is whether the ongoing economic integration has inﬂuenced the
adjustment of ﬁnancial repression revenue across countries. As shown in Aizenman (2004, 2008), in
the presence of diminishing marginal efﬁcacy of tax enforcement and costly tax collection, trade
openness of countries that repress their ﬁnancial system could lead to ﬁnancial openness, thereby
affecting the cost of servicing public debt liabilities and hence the use of ﬁnancial repression as an
1 This consideration remains an important one in the developing countries as, for instance, the cost of tax collection is 2.2
percent of total tax revenue in Argentina, 1.3 in Bolivia, 1.6 in Brazil, and 2.0 in Ecuador, whereas it is .9 in Spain and .4 in the US;
see Singh et al., 2005. While these numbers are not that large, they are non trivial.
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Table 1
Government revenue from ﬁnancial repression. Effective foreign (domestic) interest rate is calculated as foreign (domestic) interest payments divided by the amount of foreign (domestic)
debt outstanding. Financial repression tax rate [A] is the sum of the rate of currency depreciation and the difference between effective foreign and domestic interest rates [B]. The resultant
ﬁnancial repression revenue to GDP [C] is calculated as the tax rate multiplied by domestic debt outstanding divided by GDP.
Country Period Source of revenue Country Period Source of revenue
Financial
repression
tax rate
Effective
foreign
versus
domestic
interest rate
differentials
Financial
repression
revenue
to GDP
Financial
Repression
Tax Rate
Effective foreign
versus domestic
interest rate
differentials
Financial
repression
revenue
to GDP
Start End [A] [B] [C] Start End [A] [B] [C]
1 Argentina*+ 1997 2002 0.411 0.068 0.062 32 Mexico*+ 1983 2002 0.098 0.249 0.026
2 Bangladesh+ 1991 2002 0.515 0.474 0.008 33 Moldova 1998 2002 0.020 0.104 0.002
3 Belarus 1996 2001 1.471 0.095 0.074 34 Morocco+ 1979 2002 0.044 0.002 0.018
4 Belize 2001 2002 0.037 0.037 0.001 35 Myanmar 1991 1994 0.007 0.007 0.000
5 Brazil*+ 1996 2001 0.045 0.138 0.012 36 Nigeria*+ 1995 2002 0.360 0.076 0.092
6 Cameroon+ 1985 1999 0.041 0.019 0.025 37 Pakistan*+ 1990 2002 0.047 0.039 0.032
7 Chile*+ 1997 2001 0.125 0.033 0.013 38 Panama*+ 1994 2002 0.023 0.023 0.004
8 China+ 1982 2002 0.083 0.002 0.002 39 Papua
New Guinea
1992 1995 0.041 0.041 0.012
9 Colombia*+ 1981 2002 0.164 0.023 0.013 40 Peru+ 2000 2002 0.030 0.016 0.003
10 Costa Rica*+ 1991 2002 0.143 0.021 0.037 41 Philippines*+ 1996 2002 0.140 0.028 0.077
11 Croatia 1996 2002 0.058 0.005 0.007 42 Poland*+ 1992 2002 0.034 0.102 0.008
12 Czech Republic 1994 2000 0.043 0.000 0.005 43 Romania+ 1994 2002 0.522 0.045 0.143
13 Ecuador*+ 1986 2002 0.429 0.021 0.047 44 Russian
Federation
1994 2002 0.480 0.078 0.114
14 Egypt, Arab Rep.+ 1988 2002 0.140 0.022 0.084 45 Senegal+ 1981 1989 0.115 0.056 0.019
15 El Salvador*+ 2000 2001 0.027 0.026 0.000 46 Sierra Leone+ 1986 1994 0.508 0.315 0.099
16 Ethiopia+ 1983 1998 0.083 0.011 0.031 47 Slovak Republic 1995 2002 0.013 0.034 0.007
17 Gabon+ 1991 1994 0.205 0.046 0.080 48 South Africa*+ 1995 2002 0.214 0.066 0.083
18 Ghana+ 1990 1995 0.041 0.331 0.004 49 Sri Lanka+ 1990 2002 0.009 0.070 0.005
19 Guatemala*+ 1995 2002 0.052 0.092 0.003 50 Tanzania+ 1988 1999 0.089 0.149 0.006
20 Hungary*+ 1992 2001 0.106 0.040 0.071 51 Thailand*+ 1991 2002 0.018 0.031 0.004
21 India*+ 1986 2002 0.075 0.011 0.042 52 Trinidad
and Tobago*+
1985 2002 0.044 0.016 0.014
22 Indonesia*+ 1991 1999 1.012 1.314 0.015 53 Tunisia+ 1990 2000 0.025 0.012 0.006
23 Jamaica*+ 1987 2002 0.060 0.108 0.010 54 Turkey*+ 1988 2002 0.288 0.387 0.053
24 Jordan+ 1982 2002 0.063 0.020 0.021 55 Turkmenistan 1997 1998 0.276 0.050 0.002
25 Kazakhstan 1995 2002 0.256 0.035 0.013 56 Uganda+ 1991 1992 0.008 0.636 0.000
26 Latvia 2000 2002 0.039 0.056 0.002 57 Ukraine 1995 2002 5.364 5.991 0.023
27 Lebanon 1995 2002 0.103 0.089 0.079 58 Uruguay*+ 1992 2002 0.299 0.050 0.075
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Table 1 (Continued )
Country Period Source of revenue Country Period Source of revenue
Financial
repression
tax rate
Effective
foreign
versus
domestic
interest rate
differentials
Financial
repression
revenue
to GDP
Financial
Repression
Tax Rate
Effective foreign
versus domestic
interest rate
differentials
Financial
repression
revenue
to GDP
Start End [A] [B] [C] Start End [A] [B] [C]
28 Lithuania 1997 2002 0.034 0.047 0.002 59 Uzbekistan 1996 2000 0.437 0.090 0.009
29 Macedonia, FYR 1998 2002 0.065 0.011 0.013 60 Venezuela, RB*+ 1996 2002 0.252 0.112 0.023
30 Madagascar+ 1985 1988 0.298 0.031 0.637 61 Zambia+ 1985 1988 0.512 0.065 0.252
31 Malaysia+ 1991 2002 0.047 0.012 0.013 62 Zimbabwe+ 1991 2002 0.084 0.234 0.015
*(+) Denotes countries included in the panel (cross-country) estimation.
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implicit tax on the ﬁnancial system. Trade openness is thus our main variable of interest in our
estimation. As both trade openness and ﬁnancial openness are typically concurrent processes with
empirical linear feedback attributable to simultaneous correlations (Aizenman and Noy, 2006; see
also Edwards and van Wijnbergen, 1986, and Krueger, 1998), we also examine how the degree of
capital mobility affects the ﬁnancial repression revenue as a robustness check.
Since many of the trade and ﬁnancial reforms were soon interrupted by vulnerability of the ﬁscal
systems and ﬁnancial crises, our estimation also attempt to control for the relevant political economy
factors. These include the level of economic development and the institutional quality. We use GDP
per capita as a measure of economic development and expect it to be decreasing with the use of
ﬁnancial repression revenue. To measure the institutional quality, we use the polity variable as well as
the index of budgetary management, both of which should provide a proxy for the level of ﬁscal
system efﬁciency and are negatively associated with the level of ﬁnancial repression revenue in the
data.
2.1. Data
We compile and update public debt data together with relevant controls across countries over the
1990s and 2000s. Following a seminal work of Giovannini and De Melo (1993), we base our calculation
of the ﬁnancial repression revenue on actual interest payments on foreign and domestic debts to
derive the effective interest rate differentials. The appendix provides details of variable construction
and data sources, which include the World Bank’s Global Development Finance and World
Development Indicators, the World Tax Database, the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, and the
Penn World Tables. Subject to data availability, we have a total of 62 countries in the whole sample,
24–45 countries in a restricted set of sample with detailed data from 1980 to 2000 for the estimation,
and unrestricted set of 44 countries with sufﬁcient data with at least 3 observation years of both the
ﬁnancial repression revenue and relevant controls for the panel estimation. In the restricted sample
we calculated the ﬁnancial repression revenue following closely the approach in Giovannini and De
Melo (1993), whereas in the unrestricted sample we made a modiﬁcation to the calculation in order to
update the calculation with more recent ﬁgures subject to data availability, the details of which are
described in the data appendix.
We conduct the analysis using both the restricted and the unrestricted subsamples for the
following reasons. First, while the restricted sample covers only 1981–2000, the public debt data over
this period are collected mostly and uniformly by the World Bank and therefore provide a consistent
compilation of interest payment and debt stock across countries. Subsequently, the public debt data
have been jointly compiled by World Bank, BIS, IMF, and OECD, which result in the changes of
deﬁnitions and reports. Second, the restricted sub sample includes countries with detailed
information on bilateral trade data as reported by the NBER-UN World Trade Flows project,
essentially covers 1960–2000, that we use to construct the trade openness variable. Third, our
unrestricted sample in the robustness check has updated the coverage of countries to 44 and years to
2009, though this set of data may be subject to deﬁnition changes and different compilation processes
as mentioned above.
2.2. Baseline panel estimation
Table 2 reports the baseline estimation using an unbalanced panel data accounting for country and
year ﬁxed effects, as well as common and country-speciﬁc time trend. The dependent variable is the
ﬁnancial repression revenue divided by GDP. The controls include trade openness,2 GDP per capita,
and polity variable (measuring institutional quality by political durability). All the variables are in log
to allow for non-linearities. Columns A–C provide the panel results for the full sample of 24 countries,
2 As the governments may undertake trade, ﬁnancial, and other major reforms simultaneously, the trade and ﬁnancial
variables would thus be endogenous to the country characteristics (e.g. GDP per capita and institutional quality), among a
garden variety of macroeconomic consideration. We follow Frankel and Romer (1999) to use the gravity instrument for trade
openness variable.
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Table 2
Baseline estimation. This table provides the panel and cross-country regressions. The ﬁnancial repression revenue/GDP is calculated following Giovannini and De Melo (1993). Subject to
data availability, the coverage is 1981–2000. The regressions are done using the OLSwith ﬁxed effects controls and all variables are in log. For cross-country regressions, the observations are
weighted by the squared root of the number of years over which the observations are being averaged. Sub sample of countries with relatively high level of capital mobility are those at the
second to fourth quartile of the capital mobility index (Edwards, 2007). Trade openness is measured ﬁrst as gravity trade share (Frankel and Romer, 1999) and second as years since trade
reform (Wacziarg and Welch, 2008). Standard errors are in parentheses, with ***(**,*) denotes statistical signiﬁcance at 1(5,10) percent level.
Dependent variable:
ﬁnancial repression
revenue/GDP
Panel data,
full sample
Panel data,
full sample
Panel data,
full sample
Sub sample of
countries with
high capital
mobility
Sub sample of
countries with
high capital
mobility
Cross-country
sample
Cross-country
sample
A B C D E F G
Trade openness, gravity instrumented .142 .176 .176 .097 .096 .024
[.070]** [.070]** [.070]** [.085] [.084] [.009]****
Trade openness, years since trade reform .004
[.002]**
GDP per capita .213 .217 .326 .324 .041 .004
[.095]** [.095]** [.149]** [.148]** [.015]*** [.016]
Institutional quality, political durability .052 .013
[.048] [.041]
R2 .538 .554 .553 .839 .842 .146 .100
Observations 192 192 192 96 96 45 45
Countries 24 24 24 19 19 45 45
Fixed effects controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Country-trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
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while columns D–E provide the results for the countries with relatively high level of capital mobility
(i.e. second to fourth quartile of the capital mobility index, with the score above 60 out of 100 score).
Columns F and G report cross-country estimation using alternative measures of trade openness.
The baseline regressions are able to account for 54–84% of variation in the ﬁnancial repression
revenue across countries, covering 1981–2000. As shown in columns A–C, with or without controlling
for the GDP per capita and institutional quality, the trade openness variable is associated with a
statistically signiﬁcant drop in the ﬁnancial repression revenue. The level of economic development
captured in GDP per capita also has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant association with the
ﬁnancial repression revenue. The association between institutional quality and ﬁnancial repression
revenue is also negative, but not statistically signiﬁcant. The notion that countries with lower
institutional quality tend to use ‘easy-to-tax’ ﬁnancial repression revenue is therefore not supported
in this set of regressions. By separately estimating on the subset of countries with high capital mobility
in columns D and E, we ﬁnd that the negative association between the ﬁnancial repression revenue
and trade openness is potentially driven by a sub group of low capital mobility countries.
We then provide the regressions with alternative measures of trade openness and also conduct the
estimation in the cross-country context. While trade openness is typically the importance of exports
and imports in the economy (i.e. relative to GDP), alternatively trade openness may be a result of major
policy shift and liberalisation of the commercialization across borders. We address this issue by
estimating in a cross-country regression the ﬁnancial repression revenue with not only the
constructed trade share, but also the actual (exports+imports)/GDP as well as the number of years
since a country’s trade liberalisation. In a cross-country regression, as country-speciﬁc observations
are averaged over a sample of different length, we therefore weigh the variables pertaining to each
country with the square root of the number of years over which the country’s average is computed. As
shown in columns F and G of Table 2, across the 45 countries, our regressions are able to account for
10–14% of variation in the ﬁnancial repression revenue across countries. We ﬁnd that the negative
association between trade openness and ﬁnancial repression revenue is statistically signiﬁcant,
providing us further support that whether we use the de facto trade openness or the number of years
since trade liberalisation, in the panel or cross-country context, the results remain consistent across
the speciﬁcations.
To summarise the estimation of Table 2, Fig. 1 provides the economic signiﬁcance of explanatory
variables. We calculate the impact of a one standard deviation (+1s.d.) change of each explanatory
variable on the ﬁnancial repression revenue to GDP as the following. For the full panel sample of
Fig. 1. The effect (%) of one standard deviation change on the revenue from ﬁnancial repression to GDP. Calculation is based on
the estimation in Table 2. Each bar represents the product of the explanatory variable’s estimated coefﬁcient (0.176 for IV
Trade Share on the ﬁnancial repression revenue; Table 2 column C) and its standard deviation (0.60 for the log of IV Trade Share).
Coefﬁcients not statistically signiﬁcant result in missing bars.
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Table 2, a standard deviation of log trade openness variable is .6; using the coefﬁcient estimate of trade
openness in column C, .176, the effect of +1s.d. increase of trade openness is associated with a
reduction of ﬁnancial repression revenue by .6 [.176]=.106% of GDP as shown in the ﬁgure. To put
the calculation in perspective, +1s.d. change of trade openness is 22% (as of 1999, +1s.d. change of
trade openness is equivalent to going from the level of Ecuador 56% to the level of Israel 79%); the
effect of trade openness is approximately .1% on the ﬁnancial repression revenue, thereby reducing
the revenue from 4.0 to 3.9% of GDP (4.0% of GDP is the mean ﬁnancial repression revenue based on
Table 1). Notably, in the full sample the effect of trade openness on the ﬁnancial repression revenue/
GDP is .1%, whereas the effect is .06% for a group of countries with high capital mobility. This
suggests that a country with a low level of capital mobility would face an even greater ﬁscal challenge,
having had its ﬁnancial repression tax base being eroded more during its embracing of trade and
ﬁnancial globalization.
2.3. Robustness
We present in this section a robustness check to support the baseline results with more recent data
as well as further exploring the drivers for the decline in the revenue from ﬁnancial repression. Table 3
reports the panel data estimation, covering 44 countries from 1990 to 2009. In this unrestricted set of
sample countries, we make certain that each country has at least 3 observation years so that the panel
estimation can be applied suitably to the sample. Columns H–J report the panel estimation for the full
sample of 44 countries, totaling 432 observations; columns K–M for the sub set of poor budgetary
management countries (i.e. ﬁrst and second quartile of the ranking scores); columns N–P for the sub
set of good budgetary management countries (i.e. third and fourth quartile of the ranking scores).
In essence, for Table 3 we allow for a horserace between trade openness and the ﬁnancial openness
in the regression, as well as a GDP per capita control. We also dissect the composition of ﬁnancial
repression revenue, using as the dependent variable in columns H, I, J: the foreign interest rate, the
average interest rate, and the ﬁnancial repression revenue/GDP. Due to data limitation, the ﬁnancial
repression revenue in Table 3 is not precisely the one in Table 2; whereas the interest rate differential
is the effective foreign minus domestic interest rates in Table 2, the interest rate differential is the
foreign minus average interest rates on the public debts in Table 3. Thus, the latter calculation
provides an alternative approximation to the tax savings on interest payments similar to the standard
calculation of Table 2.
Based on the full sample of 44 countries, the ﬁxed-effects estimation suggests that trade openness
is negatively associated with the foreign interest rate (column H); the ﬁnancial openness is negatively
associated with the average interest rate (column I); and overall, the ﬁnancial openness is negatively
associated with the ﬁnancial repression revenue from 1990 to 2009 (column J). The association
between GDP per capita and ﬁnancial repression revenue is statistically insigniﬁcant. According to this
set of estimation, it is therefore unclear whether trade openness or ﬁnancial openness, or both that
close the gap between foreign and domestic interest rates, and hence the revenue from ﬁnancial
repression.
Next, we split the sample into a group of countries with poor level of budgetary management and a
group of countries with good level of budgetary management. In the former, we ﬁnd that ﬁnancial
openness is negatively associated with the average interest rate (column L), resulting in a positive
association between the ﬁnancial openness and ﬁnancial repression revenue/GDP (column M); thus
countries with poor budgetary management facing the ﬁnancial openness would tend to make a
greater use of ﬁnancial repression revenue. This could potentially be done by various forms of
governmental control on the domestic interest rates, thereby lowering the cost of public debt
management and imposing a ﬁnancial repression tax internally on the domestic savings. On the other
hand, for a group of countries with good budgetary management, we ﬁnd that trade openness is
negatively associated with foreign interest rate (column N); ﬁnancial openness is positively associated
with the average interest rate (column O); and the ﬁnancial openness is negatively associated with the
ﬁnancial repression revenue/GDP (column P). Indeed, the overall explanatory power on the ﬁnancial
repression revenue is also largest for the group of countries with good budgetary management. It is
thus in a set of good budgetary management countries that trade and ﬁnancial openness together
Y. Jinjarak / Economic Systems 37 (2013) 271–283278
Author's personal copy
Table 3
Robustness check. This table provides the panel results updating Table 2withmore recent data. Themodiﬁed ﬁnancial repression revenue is calculated as described in the appendix. Subject
to data availability, the coverage is 1990–2009. The regressions are done using the ﬁxed-effects estimation and all variables are in level. Trade openness ismeasured the actual trade share for
each country and year, calculated as exports plus imports, divided by gross domestic product. Financial openness is measured from the index of capital account openness, based on the IMF
Annual Reports (Chinn and Ito, 2008). Sub sample of countries with relatively good level of budgetary management are those at the third and fourth quartile of the CPIA index. A constant
term is included, but not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Dependent variable: ﬁnancial repression
revenue/GDP and components
Full sample Sub sample of countries with
poor budgetary management
Sub sample of countries with
good budgetary management
Interest rate on
foreign debt
Average
interest
rate
Financial
repression
revenue/GDP
Interest rate
on foreign
debt
Average
interest
rate
Financial
repression
revenue/GDP
Interest rate
on foreign
debt
Average
interest
rate
Financial
repression
revenue/GDP
H I J K L M N O P
Trade openness, actual trade share .012 .005 .024 .008 .002 .008 .015 .004 .039
[.006]** [.006] [.020] [.009] [.008] [.011] [.007]** [.007] [.048]
Financial openness .069 .219 2.626 .106 .724 .571 .190 .284 6.099
[.135] [.124]* [.431]*** [.229] [.201]*** [.264]** [.132] [.130]** [.855]***
GDP per capita .002 .230 .271 .171 .037 .410 .132 .467 .137
[.177] [.162] [.567] [.298] [.262] [.344] [.168] [.166]*** [1.091]
R2 .011 .014 .094 .005 .056 .031 .074 .072 .248
Observations 432 432 432 249 249 249 183 183 183
Countries 44 44 44 26 26 26 18 18 18
* Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at 1% level.
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close the gap between foreign and domestic interest rates, and hence the use of ﬁnancial repression
revenue.3
To a certain degree, we can therefore draw a consistent conclusion from both the baseline
estimation using the restricted set of data and the robustness estimation using the unrestricted
sample with more recent data. Both trade and ﬁnancial openness tend to force the governments into
reducing the use of ‘easy-to-tax’ ﬁnancial repression revenue as a part of public debt management.
Because the process of trade and ﬁnancial openness are mostly simultaneous with empirical linear
feedbacks between the two, it is not clear which is the main driving factor on the decline of ﬁnancial
repression.
However, there is supportive evidence in the data that countries with good institutional quality
and budgetary management are more likely to use less ﬁnancial repression revenue. There are at least
two channels that this can be accomplished. Firstly, a country could allow for more ﬁnancial openness,
more competition between domestically- and foreign-owned banks, thereby lowering overall
volatility of lending and credit and pushing up the effective domestic interest rate more in line with
the market signals; see Gerard Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000). Secondly, by expanding
international trade, a country could lower its vulnerability to the terms of trade ﬂuctuation and
sudden stop that link to the degree of external leverage of the absorption of tradable goods, thereby
compressing the effective foreign interest rates on the public (and private) debt management; see
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Loo-Kung (2006).
3. Conclusion
For developing countries, ﬁscal restructuring remains a challenge; a narrow tax base,
weak tax collection effort, and frequent tax amnesties are among the symptoms of low
institutional quality and poor budgetary management. This paper studies the association between
trade and ﬁnancial openness, and government revenue from ﬁnancial repression empirically
across countries. While we do not implicate on any normative assessment to which degree the
economic integration is a favourable policy to embrace, the evidence suggests that ﬁnancial
integration is associated with a reduction of the ﬁnancial repression revenue over the past two
decades.
We ﬁnd supportive evidence that countries, facing with the global trends of economic
integration, may ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to resort to what was an ‘easy-to-tax’ government
revenue from ﬁnancial repression. While developing countries could potentially shift its revenue
source away from the ﬁnancial repression tax and possibly more towards the ofﬁcial taxation,
the improvement of institutional quality and a good budgetary management are the necessary
pre-conditions in the process. There remain other open questions at the intersection of public
ﬁnance and international economics, including, for example, a further country-level study, as
well as the association between sequential trade and ﬁnancial opening in the presence of ﬁscal
reforms.
Appendix A. Data appendix A
We use several data sources in the compilation of the ﬁnancial repression revenue and relevant
macroeconomic controls. These include the World Tax Database (WTD) from the Ofﬁce of Tax Policy
3 For countries with good budgetary management, the ministry of ﬁnance and monetary authority should refrain from
borrowing at artiﬁcially low rates, be they notional or effective interests; this is supportive by the data presented. On the other
hand, countries with poor budgetary management are forced upon by the impossible trinity (capital account openness,
monetary independence, exchange rate stability): ﬁnancial openness exposes poor macroeconomic management that
inevitably affects the interest rate policy and exchange rate ﬂexibility. One possibility is that the exogenous foreign interest
rates inﬂuence the instability of domestic output, thereby reducing the effectiveness of risk sharing across borders, as well as
raising the cost of direct tax revenue collection, and increasing the attractiveness of the ﬁnancial repression revenue to the
public sector in this group of countries. While accounting for the linkages across the impossible trinity convergence, public
ﬁnance, and international trade is beyond the scope of the present study, we refer the readers Shambaugh and di Giovanni
(2008) and Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (forthcoming).
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Research, University of Michigan; World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Development
Finance (GDF) from the World Bank; the International Financial Statistics (IFS) from the IMF; Penn
World Tables (PWT) from the University of Pennsylvania; and the NBER-UN World Trade Flows from
the University of California, Davis.
Taxes: the total tax revenue to GDP and tariff revenue to GDP are calculated from the total tax
revenue in local currency (WTD) divided by the GDP in local currency (WDI).
Exchange rates: we use the local currency per US dollar (IFS) to calculate the rate of currency
depreciation.
Weighted tariff rate: the rate is in percent and compiled by the World Bank.
Financial repression revenue: we use two empirical approaches to calculate tax savings from the
use of ﬁnancial repression. Firstly, following Giovannini and De Melo (1993), the effective foreign
interest rate is calculated from the foreign interest payment in US dollar (GDF) divided by the foreign
debt outstanding in US dollar (GDF). The calculation of effective domestic interest rate is done
similarly. The ﬁnancial repression tax rate is the effective interest rate differential plus the rate of
currency depreciation. The ﬁnancial repression revenue to GDP is then calculated by multiplying the
ﬁnancial repression tax rate by the stock of domestic debt and divided by GDP. We use the ﬁnancial
repression revenue calculated by this ﬁrst approach in the baseline regressions of Table 2. Secondly, in
order to update with more recent numbers subject to data availability, we calculate the ﬁnancial
repression tax rate from the difference between the average interest rate on new ofﬁcial foreign debt
commitments and the average rate of interest payments on the aggregate ofﬁcial debts. The ﬁnancial
repression revenue is calculated by multiplying this ﬁnancial repression tax rate by the stock of public
debt, and then divided by GDP. We use the ﬁnancial repression revenue calculated by this second
approach in the robustness regressions of Table 3.
Trade openness: the actual trade share is the exports plus imports divided GDP (NBER-UN, WDI).
The number of years since trade reform is from Wacziarg and Welch (2008), based on changes in tariff
and non-tariff barriers, black market premium, and the existence of export marking board and
socialist government. The gravity-instrumented trade share is calculated following Frankel and Romer
(1999), based on their data on bilateral distance, common borders and ofﬁcial languages, land area
product, population of trading partners.
Financial openness: we use two indices of capital market integration; Edwards (2007) and Chinn
and Ito (2008). The former is the index score on the degree of openness of the capital account in each
country. The latter is based on the binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on
cross-border ﬁnancial transactions reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).
Institutional quality: we use two measures of institutional quality. The ﬁrst is polity, which
measures the political durability is from the POLITY IV project. The second is budgetary management,
which is the CPIA quality index of budgetary and ﬁnancial management rating (1=low to 6=high)
from WDI.
Real GDP per capita: the ﬁgure is in PPP (constant 2005 international dollar) from WDI.
Appendix B. Data appendix B
This data appendix provides accompanying ﬁgures for the main analysis. The presentation is
mainly done over the set of countries inclusive in the baseline regressions. For a further examination
exclusively on a relationship between globalization and other types of taxation, see Aizenman and
Jinjarak (2009).
Appendix Fig. 1 shows that the process of trade and ﬁnancial openness go hand in hand, though
they are not simultaneous. Following the criteria in Wacziarg and Welch (2008), we ﬁnd that the level
of ﬁnancial openness (measured by the capital mobility index) tends to increase by approximately 40%
following a major trade reform. The horizontal line shows the average level of capital mobility before
and after the major trade reform for each country.
Appendix Fig. S2a and b shows trade and ﬁnancial openness over the 1980s and 1990s across
geographic regions, suggesting a global trend of the periods. Appendix Fig. S2c and d shows the
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decline in the tariff rates and inﬂation, suggesting that both declined in the 1990s by a greater extent
in regions where they were above the average during the 1980s and thus converging towards a lower
common level. As also discussed in Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011), public debt liquidation depends in
a large part on the ability of government to engineer inﬂation. From the early 1980s to the late 1990s,
inﬂation dropped from 8.84 to 2.20% for the group of high-income countries, from 10.19 to 7.48% for
the group of middle-income countries, and from 10.20 to 7.66% for the group of low-income
countries.
Appendix Fig. S3a reports the total tax collection/GDP of 22 countries with comprehensive data
over the early 1980s (horizontally) and the late 1990s (vertically), whereby a further away is a
country from the 45 degree line, the greater is the change of tax/GDP over the periods. We
compare a 5-year average separated by ten years for the following reasons. First, a 5-year average
should smooth variations associated with business cycles. Second, the cumulative effects
associated with globalization should be more visible by comparing two sub periods separated by a
period of time. Fig. S3b reports the government revenue from seigniorage (inﬂation tax) and tariff
as a percentage of GDP, both of which traditionally are complementary to ﬁnancial repression
revenue (Giovannini and De Melo, 1993). As shown, the tax/GDP dropped from .182 to .176, the
seigniorage and tariff to GDP dropped from .060 to .046. The quadratic ﬁtted line allows for non
linearity; the concavity of the cross-country pattern in Fig. S3b suggests that countries that relied
heavily on the seigniorage and tariff revenue had confronted a greater loss; see also Aizenman and
Jinjarak, 2009.
Appendix Figs. S4a and b reports together the ‘easy-to-tax’ revenues from seigniorage, tariff, and
ﬁnancial repression revenue. Notably is the non-linearity in the adjustment of ﬁnancial repression
revenue across the income groups.
Appendix Fig. S5a and b shows the difference between actual trade share and instrumental variable
(IV) constructed trade share. The instrument is constructed from geographical determinants of
bilateral trade, including log of distance, log of partner country population, log of area, dummy
variables for common language, common land border, and landlocked status. After estimating the
gravity model, we aggregate the exponent of the ﬁtted values across bilateral trading partners to arrive
at an estimate of total trade share for a given country.
Appendix C. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecosys.2012.10.003.
Appendix Fig. 1. de jure trade and ﬁnancial integration.
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